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OPINION OF THE COURT

AMBRO, Circuit Judge
In 2008, the District Attorney of Wyoming County in
Pennsylvania presented teens suspected of “sexting” with a
choice: either attend an education program designed by the
District Attorney in conjunction with two other agencies or face
felony child pornography charges. Plaintiffs brought suit to
enjoin the District Attorney from bringing criminal charges in
retaliation for their refusal to attend the education program—an
3

act they allege is constitutionally protected—and immediately
filed a motion for preliminary injunctive relief. The District
Court granted their motion. While the case was on appeal, the
District Attorney determined that he would not file criminal
charges against two of the three plaintiff minors. As to the
remaining minor, Nancy Doe, and her mother, Jane Doe, we
agree with the District Court that they have shown a likelihood
of success on the merits of their constitutional retaliation claims,
and therefore they are entitled to preliminary injunctive relief.
Accordingly, we affirm.
I.

Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiffs MaryJo Miller, Jami Day, and Jane Doe,
mothers of, respectively, plaintiffs Marissa Miller, Grace Kelly,
and Nancy Doe,1 filed suit against the District Attorney of
Wyoming County, in his official capacity only, alleging
retaliation in violation of their constitutional rights. The
allegations in their complaint center on the District Attorney’s
investigation and threatened prosecution of “sexting” by minors,
and his requirement that plaintiffs attend an education program
to avoid prosecution on child pornography charges.
“Sexting,” as defined by plaintiffs, is “the practice of
sending or posting sexually suggestive text messages and

1

The District Court granted the motion of “Nancy Doe” and
“Jane Doe” to proceed under pseudonyms.
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images, including nude or semi-nude photographs, via cellular
telephones or over the Internet.” In October 2008, school
officials in the Tunkhannock, Pennsylvania, School District
discovered photographs of semi-nude and nude teenage girls,
many of whom were enrolled in their district, on several
students’ cell phones.2 The officials learned that male students
had been trading these images over their cell phones, and turned
the phones over to the Wyoming County District Attorney’s
Office. George Skumanick, then District Attorney, began an
investigation.
In November 2008, Skumanick stated publicly to local
newspaper reporters and an assembly at Tunkhannock High
School that students possessing “inappropriate images of
minors” could be prosecuted under Pennsylvania law for
possession or distribution of child pornography, 18 Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 6312,3 or criminal use of a communication facility, 18 Pa.

2

The facts are gleaned from plaintiffs’ complaint, the
evidentiary hearing, and the District Court’s comprehensive
opinion.
3

Section 6312, titled “[s]exual abuse of children,” makes it
a crime to “cause[ ] or knowingly permit[ ] a child under the age
of 18 years to engage in a prohibited sexual act . . . if such
person knows, has reason to know or intends that such act may
be photographed, videotaped, depicted on computer or filmed.”
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6312(b).
5

Cons. Stat. § 7512.4 A few months later, Skumanick sent a letter
to the parents of between 16 and 20 students 5 —students on
whose cell phones the pictures were stored and students
appearing in the photographs—threatening to bring charges
against those who did not participate in what has been referred
to as an “education program”:
[Child’s Name] has been identified in a police
investigation involving the possession and/or
dissemination of child pornography.
In
consultation with the Victims Resource Center
and the Juvenile Probation Department, we have
developed a six to nine month program which
focuses on education and counseling. If you[r]
son/daughter successfully completes this
program[,] no charges will be filed and no record
of his/her involvement will be maintained.
We have scheduled a meeting with all of the

4

Section 7512 prohibits the use of a communication facility
“to commit, cause or facilitate the commission or the attempt
thereof of any crime which constitutes a felony . . . .” 18 Pa.
Cons. Stat. § 7512(a).
5

Skumanick asserts that the program was offered to 13 girls
and 3 boys, but plaintiffs’ complaint alleges the letters were sent
to approximately 20 students.
6

identified juveniles and their parents to discuss
the program in more detail and to answer your
questions. Following the meeting you will be
asked to participate in the program. Participation
in the program is voluntary.
Please note,
however, charges will be filed against those that
do not participate or those that do not successfully
complete the program.
The education program was divided into a Female Group
and Male Group. The “Female Group” syllabus lists among its
objectives that the participants “gain an understanding of what
it means to be a girl in today’s society, both advantages and
disadvantages.”
In the first session, students are assigned to write “a
report explaining why you are here,” “[w]hat you did,” “[w]hy
it was wrong,” “[d]id you create a victim? If so, who?,” and
how their actions “affect[ed] the victim[,] [t]he school[, and] the
community.” The first two sessions focus on sexual violence,
and the third on sexual harassment. The fourth session is titled
“Gender identity-Gender strengths,” and the fifth “Self
Concept,” which includes a “Gender Advantages and
Disadvantages” exercise.
At the group meeting scheduled by the letter, held on
February 12, 2009, Skumanick repeated his threat to bring
felony charges unless the children submitted to probation, paid
7

a $100 program fee, and completed the education program
successfully. One parent, whose daughter had appeared in a
photo wearing a bathing suit, asked how his child could be
charged with child pornography based on that picture.
Skumanick responded that she was posing “provocatively.”
When plaintiff Marissa Miller’s father asked Skumanick who
decided what “provocative” meant, Skumanick refused to
answer and reminded his audience he could charge all of the
minors with felonies, but instead was offering the education
program. He told Mr. Miller, “[T]hese are the rules[. I]f you
don’t like them, too bad.”
He then asked the parents to sign an agreement assigning
the minors to probation and to participation in the program.
Only one parent did so. Skumanick gave the other parents one
week to sign.
Before the meeting, Skumanick had shown plaintiff
MaryJo Miller and her ex-husband the two-year-old photograph
of their daughter, in which Marissa Miller and Grace Kelly, 12
or 13-years-old at the time, are shown from the waist up wearing
white, opaque bras. Marissa was speaking on the phone, while
Grace was making a peace sign. Despite Ms. Miller’s protests
that her daughter and friend were merely being “goof balls” and
were not naked, Skumanick claimed the image constituted child
pornography because they were posed “provocatively.” He
promised to prosecute them on felony child pornography
charges if they did not agree to his conditions and attend the
8

proposed program.
After the meeting, Skumanick showed Jane Doe the
photograph of her daughter Nancy, taken about a year earlier.
In the photograph, Nancy is wrapped in a white, opaque towel,
just below her breasts, appearing as if she just had emerged from
the shower.
Eleven days later, on February 23, an administrator from
Juvenile Court Services wrote the parents to inform them of an
appointment scheduled for the following Saturday, February 28,
at the Wyoming County Courthouse, “to finalize the paperwork
for the informal adjustment.” All of the parents and minors,
except plaintiffs in this case, agreed to the conditions. The
parties do not allege, and the record does not contain evidence
of, any further communication between Skumanick and
plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs filed suit on March 25, 2009, and immediately
sought a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) enjoining the
District Attorney from initiating criminal charges against
plaintiffs for the photographs. The District Court held a hearing
the following day with both sides represented, and allowed the
District Attorney to file a post-hearing brief in opposition. The
District Court granted the requested relief on March 30, 2009,
and the District Attorney timely filed an interlocutory appeal.
While this case was on appeal, Skumanick was defeated
9

by Jeff Mitchell in the November 2009 election. Mitchell took
office in January 2010. We refer to Skumanick when detailing
the events underlying the lawsuit.
II.

Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. We agree with the parties that the order titled a
temporary restraining order by the District Court (a generally
non-appealable order) was in effect a preliminary injunction (an
appealable order) because it was entered for an indeterminate
period of time after notice to the defendant and an adversary
hearing. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2), TROs expire 10 days 6
after issuance, subject to extension. See In re Arthur Treacher’s
Franchise Litig., 689 F.2d 1150, 1155 n.7 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting
that we “will look beyond terminology to the actual content,
purport, and effect of that which may otherwise be described as
a temporary restraining order or as a preliminary injunction”).
Therefore, we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1).
Ordinarily, we use a three-part standard to review a
District Court’s grant of a preliminary injunction: we review the
Court’s findings of fact for clear error, its conclusions of law de
novo, and the ultimate decision to grant the preliminary

6

After the order in this case, the time limit was extended
from 10 days to 14 days. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(2).
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injunction for abuse of discretion. McTernan v. City of York,
577 F.3d 521, 526 (3d Cir. 2009). However, when First
Amendment rights are at issue, we “must conduct an
independent examination of the factual record as a whole.” Id.
III.

Preliminary Considerations

Before reviewing the grant of the injunction, we address
two threshold arguments raised by the District Attorney on
appeal. First, he argues that, given the existence of an ongoing
state juvenile informal adjustment proceeding, we must abstain
from entertaining plaintiffs’ suit. Second, he argues that his
promise made on appeal not to prosecute Miller or Day renders
their case moot. We address each argument in turn.
A.

Abstention

Under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), federal
courts must abstain in certain circumstances from exercising
jurisdiction over a claim where resolution of that claim would
interfere with an ongoing state proceeding. We exercise plenary
review over whether the requirements for abstention have been
met. Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d
399, 408 (3d Cir. 2005).
According to the District Attorney, the offer of the
education program as an alternative to prosecution was proposed
under the informal adjustment procedure in 42 Pa. Cons. Stat.
11

§ 6323, and therefore a state criminal proceeding was pending
against plaintiffs when they filed their complaint in federal
court. This argument fails on two grounds.
First, while informal adjustment had been offered by the
District Attorney, it had not begun because informal adjustment
requires the consent of the parents and the minor. See Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 6323(b)(2); Commonwealth v. J.H.B., 760 A.2d 27, 32
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (“Whatever [informal adjustment]
procedure is undertaken flows from the consent of the child and
his parent.”); Commonwealth v. C.L., 963 A.2d 489, 493 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2008) (“[T]he fee imposed could not be an informal
adjustment as that term is intended by § 6323 because [the
minor] did not consent to the fee.”); see also Haw. Hous. Auth.
v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 238–39 (1984) (“Younger is not a bar
to federal court action when state judicial proceedings have not
themselves commenced.”).7 Indeed, the District Attorney
argued in his brief to the District Court that “no prosecution has
been initiated” and “charges . . . have yet to be brought.”
“Absent any pending proceeding in state tribunals, . . .

7

See also Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930–31
(1975) (affirming a preliminary injunction against future
criminal prosecutions, and holding that Younger did not apply
because there was no pending state court proceeding); Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 454 (1974) (where “a state
prosecution has been threatened, but is not pending,” federal
declaratory relief is available).
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application . . . of Younger abstention w[ould be] clearly
erroneous.” Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 705 (1992)
(emphasis in original).
Second, even assuming an informal adjustment had
begun, Younger abstention is appropriate “only when (1) there
are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the
state proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the
state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise federal
claims.” Kendall v. Russell, 572 F.3d 126, 131 (3d Cir. 2009)
(citation omitted). That is not the case here.
Informal adjustment is not “judicial in nature,” but a
diversion away from the judicial system to a “public or private
social agency.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6323(a)(1). It “invokes the
court’s social service and supervisory resources without
implicating the court’s formal and coercive powers, including
the power to commit the child to custody or confinement.”
J.H.B., 760 A.2d at 32; see also id. (describing informal
adjustment as “a preliminary pre-petition procedure to provide
assistance, counseling[,] and supervision, where the behavior is
either socially disruptive (but not criminal) or where the
delinquency has not created major or serious consequences”).
Most importantly, the informal adjustment procedures provide
no opportunity to raise federal claims (or, for that matter, any
legal challenges).
Therefore, Younger abstention is
inappropriate here.

13

B.

Mootness

In his appellate brief, Skumanick stated that he “has
determined that he will bring no criminal charges against
Appellees[] Miller and Kelly,” and “[t]he claims of Miller and
Kelly are therefore moot.” Appellant’s Br. at 4. At oral
argument, counsel for Mitchell confirmed that charges would
not be brought against the two minors. Oral Arg. Tr. at 3.
While it is curious that the District Attorney did not
withdraw his appeal as to these two minors and their mothers
and consent to a permanent injunction, Mitchell’s counsel
committed at oral argument to making formal the District
Attorney’s new position. Id. at 3–4. We accept counsel’s
representation to us, and agree that this appeal as to the minors
Marissa Miller and Grace Kelly, and their mothers, MaryJo
Miller and Jami Day, is mooted by the District Attorney’s
agreement to provide their requested relief. See DeJohn v.
Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 308–09 (3d Cir. 2008). Thus, our
analysis focuses only on the preliminary injunction as it applies
to plaintiffs Nancy and Jane Doe.
IV.

Discussion

A party seeking a preliminary injunction must satisfy the
traditional four-factor test: (1) a likelihood of success on the
merits; (2) he or she will suffer irreparable harm if the
injunction is denied; (3) granting relief will not result in even
14

greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) the public interest
favors such relief. Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J. Inc. v.
Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 514, 524 (3d Cir. 2004).
We agree with the District Court’s analysis of irreparable
harm, harm to the non-moving party, and the public interest, see
Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 646–47 (M.D. Pa.
2009), and therefore focus our discussion, as did the parties, on
the first factor, likelihood of success on the merits.8 At this
stage, we “generally do[] not go into the merits any farther than
is necessary to determine whether the moving party established
a likelihood of success.” Child Evangelism Fellowship, 386
F.3d at 524 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

8

We reject the District Attorney’s argument that irreparable
injury would not occur if felony charges were filed because
juvenile proceedings are closed, rehabilitative in nature, and
Doe would have the right to counsel, the right to put the state to
its burden of proof, and the benefit of state appellate court
review. Because, as discussed below, the Does have shown a
likelihood of success on the merits of their retaliation claim,
they have necessarily shown that irreparable harm would result
absent an injunction. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373
(1976) (“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even
minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable
injury.”).
15

A.

Plaintiffs’ Legal Theory of Relief

To state a claim under § 1983, plaintiffs must show that
the defendant, under the color of state law, deprived them of a
federal constitutional or statutory right. See Gruenke v. Seip,
225 F.3d 290, 298 (3d Cir. 2000). Plaintiffs base their claims on
retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally protected rights,
which “is itself a violation of rights secured by the Constitution
actionable under section 1983.” White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d
103, 111–12 (3d Cir. 1990). To prevail on a retaliation claim,
a plaintiff must prove “(1) that he engaged in
constitutionally-protected activity; (2) that the government
responded with retaliation; and (3) that the protected activity
caused the retaliation.” Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d
274, 282 (3d Cir. 2004). At the preliminary injunction stage,
plaintiffs need only show a reasonable probability that their
retaliation claims will succeed on the merits. McTernan, 577
F.3d at 526.
The initial plaintiffs brought three causes of action in
their complaint: (1) retaliation in violation of the minors’ First
Amendment right to free expression, the expression being their
appearing in two photographs; (2) retaliation in violation of the
minors’ First Amendment right to be free from compelled
speech, the speech being the education program’s required essay
explaining how their actions were wrong; and (3) retaliation in
violation of the parents’ Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process right to direct their children’s upbringing, the
16

interference being certain items in the education program that
fall within the domain of the parents, not the District Attorney.
The District Court granted injunctive relief based only on
the second and third claims, and the parties did not brief the first
claim before us. While we requested supplemental briefing on
plaintiffs’ first cause of action, we decline to consider it in the
first instance. (Of course, plaintiffs may advance that cause of
action on remand as the case proceeds on the merits.)
Accordingly, we will consider only those causes of action
addressed by the District Court and raised by the parties—the
second and third claims.
Before going further, we focus on the act of retaliation
urged by plaintiffs. We discern two possibilities based on
plaintiffs’ complaint and argument: (1) the District Attorney
retaliated against plaintiffs when he threatened prosecution; and
(2) any future prosecution would be an unconstitutional act of
retaliation. As discussed below, only the second theory is
viable.
The first theory—the theory accepted by the District
Court—is that the District Attorney’s “threatened prosecution is
retaliation for the exercise of their First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights for refusing to participate in the education
program at issue here.” Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 643. In other
words, plaintiffs asserted a constitutionally protected right to
refuse to participate in the education program, and the District
17

Attorney responded to that assertion with threats to prosecute
the minors for the sole purpose of coercing them to attend the
program.
This claim presents a timing problem, as the District
Attorney threatened to prosecute Doe before she refused to
attend the program. Such a threat of prosecution was not
retaliation “in response to” and “because of” the exercise of a
right not to attend the program, as Doe had not yet asserted that
right when the District Attorney made the threat to prosecute.
Because this theory has a sequence flaw, we cannot affirm the
District Court’s grant of injunctive relief on this basis.9 Cf.

9

Plaintiffs bring no direct constitutional claim, only claims
of retaliation. Had they pled a direct constitutional violation, we
would apply intermediate or strict scrutiny to determine whether
the threats of prosecution unconstitutionally burdened or
inhibited the exercise of their First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights not to attend the education program. For an example of
a direct constitutional claim based on the threat of prosecution,
see Porter v. Bowen, 496 F.3d 1009, 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2007)
(threat of prosecution that “severely burdened” expressive
conduct protected by the First Amendment did not survive
intermediate scrutiny); see also Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United
States, 442 F.3d 177, 183 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting that courts may
enjoin criminal prosecutions “in limited situations where the
mere threat of prosecution would inhibit the exercise of
constitutional freedoms”); Aiello v. City of Wilmington, 623 F.2d
845, 857 (3d Cir. 1980) (“An impermissible chill is created
18

Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 558 n.10 (2007) (“In the
standard retaliation case recognized in our precedent, the
plaintiff has performed some discrete act in the past, typically
saying something that irritates the defendant official; the
question is whether the official’s later action against the
plaintiff was taken for a legitimate purpose (firing to rid the
work force of a substandard performer, for example) or for the
purpose of punishing for the exercise of a constitutional right
(that is, retaliation, probably motivated by spite). The plaintiff’s
action is over and done with, and the only question is the
defendant’s purpose, which may be maliciously motivated.”)
(emphases added); Morón-Barradas v. Dep’t of Educ., 488 F.3d
472, 481 (1st Cir. 2007) (“It is impossible for the DOE to have
retaliated against Morón before she engaged in protected

when one is deterred from engaging in protected activity by the
existence of a governmental regulation or the threat of
prosecution thereunder.”). Such a claim would not have a
timing problem.
A retaliation claim is different. It asks not whether the
exercise of a right has been unconstitutionally burdened or
inhibited (in other words, survives rational basis, intermediate
scrutiny, or strict scrutiny review), but whether the Government
is punishing the plaintiffs for exercising their rights. Under the
doctrine of retaliation, “an otherwise legitimate and
constitutional government act can become unconstitutional
when an individual demonstrates that it was undertaken in
retaliation for his exercise of First Amendment speech.”
Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 161 (3d Cir. 1997).
19

activity.”); Durkin v. City of Chicago, 341 F.3d 606, 614–15
(7th Cir. 2003) (“It is axiomatic that a plaintiff engage in
statutorily protected activity before an employer can retaliate
against her for engaging in statutorily protected activity. . . .
[W]e have never held that an employer can retaliate when there
has been no protected expression. An employer cannot retaliate
if there is nothing for it to retaliate against.”).
Plaintiffs’ second theory—that a future prosecution
would be the retaliatory act—does not suffer the same timing
defect, as any prosecution will necessarily come after Doe’s
refusal to attend the program.10 We discern this theory from
plaintiffs’ TRO motion before the District Court, which stated,
“Although the retaliation has not yet occurred, it is ‘of sufficient
immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance’ of an order
enjoining the threatened prosecution.” (Emphasis added.)
Other statements in the same motion espouse this second theory:
plaintiffs asserted they sought relief “to bar Skumanick from
bringing the retaliatory criminal charges” for their refusal to
attend the program, that “Skumanick has assured [them] that he
will retaliate by filing” criminal charges, and that “plaintiff
minors would be subject to an adverse action if they are

10

While the record does not reveal that Doe expressly told
the District Attorney she would not attend the program, the Does
did not attend the February 28 meeting to finalize the informal
adjustment paperwork, but instead filed this lawsuit. We think
this sufficient as a refusal to attend the program.
20

prosecuted for child pornography.” (Emphases added.)
The District Court also recognized plaintiffs’ second
variation on their retaliation claim, stating:
Plaintiffs insist that retaliation exists here because
(1) minor plaintiffs have a constitutional right to
avoid the courses and their parents have a
constitutional right to direct their education; (2)
prosecution of the girls would be retaliation (an
adverse action); and (3) because the girls’ pictures
were not illegal, the only reason to prosecute them
would be in retaliation for exercising their
constitutional right not to participate in the
program.
Miller, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 643 (emphases added).
In other words, plaintiffs seek injunctive relief to prevent
a future retaliatory act—an actual prosecution that has not yet
been brought—from occurring. As discussed below, we affirm
the District Court on this alternative ground.11 See Ayers v.

11

The District Attorney does not raise, and we do not
perceive, any problems regarding plaintiffs’ standing or
ripeness. Skumanick’s direct and clear threat to prosecute
establishes as real and immediate the danger Doe would be
prosecuted when she refused to attend the education program.
21

Philadelphia Hous. Auth., 908 F.2d 1184, 1196 (3d Cir. 1990)
(affirming “on a different ground” the district court’s denial of
a preliminary injunction motion).
B.

Elements of Retaliation
1.

Constitutionally Protected Activity

Turning to the first element of a retaliation claim, we
agree with the District Court that plaintiffs have shown a
reasonable likelihood of establishing that coercing Doe’s
participation in the education program violated (a) Jane Doe’s
Fourteenth Amendment right to parental autonomy and (b)
Nancy Doe’s First Amendment right against compelled speech.
a.

Parent’s Fourteenth Amendment
Right

Parents have a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process right “to raise their children without undue state
interference.” Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 303.12 “Choices about
marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are among
associational rights this Court has ranked as of basic importance

12

While retaliation cases often are based on First
Amendment rights, the doctrine applies when there is official
retaliation for the exercise of “any constitutional right.”
Anderson, 125 F.3d at 162 (emphasis in original).
22

in our society, rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment
against the State’s unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or
disrespect.” M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Indeed, the “interest of
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children[] is
perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests,” Troxel
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000), and is well-established by
long-standing Supreme Court precedent.
See Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401 (1923) (recognizing that the
Constitution protects the right of parents to “bring up children”
and “to control the education of their own”); Pierce v. Soc’y of
the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510,
534–35 (1925) (acknowledging parents’ right “to direct the
upbringing and education of” their children); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (observing the
“cardinal” principle that “the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 233 (1972) (recognizing parents’ right to instill in their
children “moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of
good citizenship”).
Here, Jane Doe objects to the education program’s
lessons in why the minors’ actions were wrong, what it means
to be a girl in today’s society, and non-traditional societal and
job roles. Appellees’ Br. at 18–19. She particularly opposes
these value lessons from a District Attorney who has “stated
publicly that a teen[]age girl who voluntarily posed for a photo
wearing a swimsuit violated Pennsylvania’s child pornography
23

statute.” Id. at 19. The program’s teachings that the minors’
actions were morally “wrong” and created a victim contradict
the beliefs she wishes to instill in her daughter.
We agree that an individual District Attorney may not
coerce parents into permitting him to impose on their children
his ideas of morality and gender roles. An essential component
of Jane Doe’s right to raise her daughter—the “responsibility to
inculcate moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of
good citizenship,” Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 307—was interfered
with by the District Attorney’s actions. While it may have been
constitutionally permissible for the District Attorney to offer this
education voluntarily (that is, free of consequences for not
attending), he was not free to coerce attendance by threatening
prosecution.
Our case law and Pennsylvania’s statutory law recognize
that school officials have a “‘secondary responsibility’” in the
upbringing of children, and “in certain circumstances the
parental right to control the upbringing of a child must give way
to a school’s ability to control curriculum and the school
environment.” C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159,
182 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 307); 24 Pa.
Stat. Ann. § 13-1317 (“Every teacher, vice principal and
principal in the public schools shall have the right to exercise the
same authority as to conduct and behavior over the pupils
attending his school, during the time they are in attendance,
including the time required in going to and from their homes, as
24

the parents, guardians or persons in parental relation to such
pupils may exercise over them.”). We can say with assuredness,
however, that the District Attorney is not imbued with that same
“secondary responsibility.” Indeed, we find no support for this
proposition in any related statute, regulation, or case. The
District Attorney is not a public education official, but a public
law enforcement official. We do not express a view on the
propriety of this program had it been offered as part of the
school curriculum,13 though we note that Jane Doe has a
constitutionally protected right to choose the school her child
attends, see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 178 (1976), a
choice lacking in the current context.
We conclude that Jane Doe is likely to succeed in
showing that the education program required by the District
Attorney impermissibly usurped and violated her fundamental
right to raise her child without undue state interference.
b.

Minor’s First Amendment Right

Government action that requires stating a particular
message favored by the government violates the First

13

Cf. Combs v. Homer-Center Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 248
n.24 (3d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (recognizing that federal courts
“have held that parents have no right to exempt their child from
certain subjects, reading assignments, community-service
requirements[,] or assembly programs they find objectionable”).
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Amendment right to refrain from speaking. C.N., 430 F.3d at
187;14 see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns
Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (recognizing that
“[g]overnment action that . . . requires the utterance of a
particular message favored by the Government . . . contravenes
th[e] essential right” to refrain from speaking protected by the
First Amendment); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C.,
Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796–97 (1988) (“[T]he First Amendment
guarantees ‘freedom of speech,’ a term necessarily comprising
the decision of both what to say and what not to say.”)
(emphasis in original). A violation of the First Amendment
right against compelled speech occurs “only in the context of
actual compulsion,” although that compulsion need not be a
direct threat. C.N., 430 F.3d at 189.
According to plaintiffs, the compelled speech arises from
the program’s requirement that the minors write a homework

14

In C.N., while we recognized that the “Supreme Court has
only ever found a violation of the First Amendment right against
compelled speech in the context of forced speech that requires
the private speaker to embrace a particular government-favored
message,” we held that the First Amendment right against
compelled speech is not limited to the government’s requiring
a speaker to express a certain viewpoint or message; requiring
content-neutral speech may violate the First Amendment,
although it will be subject to a different level of scrutiny than
content-based requirements. 430 F.3d at 188.
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paper explaining “how [their] actions were wrong.” Jane and
Nancy Doe do not agree that appearing in the photograph was
wrong, and they assert that requiring Nancy Doe to write an
essay to that effect “invades the sphere of intellect and spirit
which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our
Constitution to reserve from all official control.” W.V. State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that
mandatory participation in Pledge of Allegiance violated
children’s First Amendment free speech rights).
The
compulsion here takes the form of the District Attorney’s
promise to prosecute Doe if she does not satisfactorily complete
the education program.
We agree with the District Court at this preliminary stage
that Nancy Doe likely can show that the education program
would violate her First Amendment freedom against compelled
speech. She would be required to explain why her actions were
wrong (presumably as a moral, not a legal, matter) in the
context of a program that purports to teach, as Mitchell’s
counsel described at oral argument, “[w]hat it means to be a girl;
sexual self-respect, [and] sexual identity.” Oral Arg. Tr. at 14.
We see a fundamental distinction between this requirement and
the oft-used and constitutionally sound requirement in preindictment or pre-trial diversion programs that a potential
defendant acknowledge responsibility for his or her criminal
conduct or admit wrongdoing. “[W]hat it means to be a girl in
today’s society,” while an important sociological concern, in this
case is a disconnect with the criminal and juvenile justice
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systems. This mismatch is all the more troubling given the age
of the program’s participants.
Minors often are more
susceptible to external influences, and while this susceptibility
may weigh in favor of certain educational or rehabilitative
programs, it also cautions against allowing actors in the juvenile
and criminal justice systems to venture outside the realm of their
elected authority.
2.

Government Responded with Retaliation

Under the second element of a retaliation claim, plaintiffs
must show the Government responded with a retaliatory act.
The test in our Circuit for determining whether an action is
treated as retaliation is whether it is “sufficient to deter a person
of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights.”
Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal
quotation marks, citation, and alteration omitted). There is no
doubt a prosecution meets this test, and the District Attorney
does not argue otherwise. See Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250
(2006) (discussing retaliatory prosecution cases).
3.

Causation

The third element of a retaliation claim connects the
previous two—there must be a causal link between the protected
activity (the first element) and the retaliatory act (the second
element). Plaintiffs allege that there is no probable cause to
prosecute Doe, and the District Attorney’s only motive for
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bringing a prosecution is to retaliate against her for refusing to
attend the education program.15 We agree that plaintiffs have
shown a likelihood of success on the causation prong of their
retaliation claim, given the District Attorney’s explicit statement
that he will respond to (that is, retaliate for) Nancy Doe’s failure
to attend the education program, or not completing that program
if she starts, by prosecuting her. Among other examples, a letter
signed by Skumanick states that “charges will be filed against
those that do not participate or those that do not successfully
complete the program.” He reiterated this threat at the February
12 meeting, and asserted on appeal unequivocally that “[Doe]
could have refused to attend the class or write any essay and
merely defended herself against the Juvenile Petition . . . .”
Appellant’s Br. at 10.
By agreeing not to prosecute the minors if they attended
and completed the program, the District Attorney’s only motive

15

We note that the constitutionality of the sexual abuse of
children statute is not at issue (at least directly) in plaintiffs’
second and third causes of action; plaintiffs instead challenge
the constitutionality of the prosecutor’s act of bringing a
prosecution (no matter what the statute) to punish them for
asserting their constitutional rights. In this regard, we view
plaintiffs’ citation to Steffel, 415 U.S. at 462, 475, and Wooley
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 710–15 (1977), as unhelpful because
in those cases the plaintiffs alleged that the criminal statute
directly violated their constitutional rights.
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for bringing a prosecution against Doe would be, as he stated,
a consequence of her not attending or completing it. In other
words, it is uncontroverted that the District Attorney would not
have brought criminal charges had Doe attended and completed
the program. Of course, every offer of a pre-indictment
diversionary program presents a choice potential defendants
must make, and a prosecution brought after the offer of
diversion is refused ordinarily is not considered retaliation. The
difference here is the decision not to attend the program is
constitutionally protected (at least at this stage plaintiffs have
shown a reasonable likelihood this is so) for the reasons stated
in Part IV.B.1.
That the District Attorney’s motive in bringing a
prosecution is likely retaliatory, rather than a good faith effort to
enforce the law, is supported by the lack of evidence of probable
cause. See Hartman, 547 U.S. at 265 (“[A] retaliatory motive
on the part of an official urging prosecution combined with an
absence of probable cause supporting the prosecutor’s decision
to go forward are reasonable grounds to suspend the
presumption of regularity behind the charging decision, see
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (emphasizing
that ‘so long as the prosecutor has probable cause,’ the charging
decision is generally discretionary), and enough for a prima
facie inference that the unconstitutionally motivated inducement
infected the prosecutor’s decision to bring the charge.”).
Assuming that the sexual abuse of children law applies to a
minor depicted in the allegedly pornographic photograph, and
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that the photo in question could constitute a “prohibited sexual
act” 16 (issues on which we need not opine), we discern no
indication from this record that the District Attorney had any
evidence that Doe ever possessed or distributed the photo.
When asked at oral argument the basis for probable cause to
charge Doe with possession or distribution of child
pornography, Mitchell’s counsel answered that it was “[t]he
existence of that photograph . . . [,] the presence of that
photograph on the cell phones of one or more of her . . .
classmates.” Oral Arg. Tr. at 20. But appearing in a photograph
provides no evidence as to whether that person possessed or
transmitted the photo. Mitchell’s counsel could not make a
representation to us as to whether the District Attorney had, at
the time of the TRO hearing (which, we note, was months after
Skumanick threatened to prosecute), any evidence of her
transmission of the photo. Oral Arg. Tr. at 21. Despite ample
16

“Prohibited sexual act” is defined as “sexual intercourse
. . . , masturbation, sadism, masochism, bestiality, fellatio,
cunnilingus, lewd exhibition of the genitals or nudity if such
nudity is depicted for the purpose of sexual stimulation or
gratification of any person who might view such depiction.” 18
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6312. This statute was amended during
the pendency of this appeal, see H.B. 89, 193rd Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2009), but the amendments are not material to
this case. The photograph of Doe could only fall under the last
category—“nudity . . . depicted for the purpose of sexual
stimulation or gratification of any person who might view such
depiction.”
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opportunity, the District Attorney has failed to present any
semblance of probable cause.
The District Court may revisit this determination at a
later date, and the District Attorney is free to move to vacate the
injunction if he thinks he has secured probable cause. In
Hartman, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs bringing
retaliatory prosecution claims must allege and prove lack of
probable cause as an element of causation. 547 U.S. at 252.
Therefore, if probable cause exists, the injunction must be lifted.
The suit in Hartman was brought against criminal
investigators for inducing prosecution in retaliation for protected
speech. A “distinct problem of causation” exists in retaliatoryinducement-to-prosecute cases, as a “causal gap” exists between
the actor possessing the retaliatory animus (the government
agent) and the other actor (the prosecutor) instituting the
retaliation. Id. at 262–64. This “distinct problem of causation”
does not exist here, as the same actor (the District Attorney)
possesses the retaliatory motive and would institute the
prosecution. However, given Hartman’s broad holding that
probable cause must be pled and proven in retaliatory
prosecution cases, and the Supreme Court’s reliance on “the
longstanding presumption of regularity accorded to prosecutorial
decision making,” id. at 263, we eschew any attempt to
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distinguish Hartman from our case.17 See Barnes v. Wright, 449
F.3d 709, 720 (6th Cir. 2006) (applying Hartman, even though
the concerns regarding the intervening actions of a prosecutor
did not apply—the officers themselves initiated the allegedly
retaliatory grand jury proceedings—because the Hartman Court
recognized that its rule swept broadly by stating that causation
in retaliatory prosecution cases is “usually more complex than
it is in other retaliation cases”) (quoting Hartman, 547 U.S. at
261) (emphasis supplied in Barnes). Under Hartman, then,
plaintiffs cannot succeed without proving an absence of
probable cause.
Given that the only items of evidence in the record of the
District Attorney’s motive, at least at this preliminary stage, are
(1) the existence of the photograph on another student’s phone,
and (2) the District Attorney’s threat to prosecute for
nonattendance at the education program, plaintiffs have
established a reasonable likelihood of success as to causation.
In sum, absent an injunction, the Does would have to

17

We note that Hartman did not anticipate actions for
retaliatory prosecutions against prosecutors, as prosecutors
ordinarily enjoy absolute immunity from damage liability. See
Hartman, 547 U.S. at 261–62 (“A Bivens (or § 1983) action for
retaliatory prosecution will not be brought against the
prosecutor, who is absolutely immune from liability for the
decision to prosecute . . . .”).
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choose either to assert their constitutional rights and face a
prosecution of Nancy Doe based not on probable cause but as
punishment for exercising their constitutional rights, or forgo
those rights and avoid prosecution. On the facts before us, this
Hobson’s Choice is unconstitutional. While “the Government
retains broad discretion as to whom to prosecute,” “the decision
to prosecute may not be deliberately based on . . . arbitrary
classification, including the exercise of protected statutory and
constitutional rights.” Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598,
607–08 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted);
see also United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982)
(“For while an individual certainly may be penalized for
violating the law, he just as certainly may not be punished for
exercising a protected statutory or constitutional right.”).
We realize that considerations of comity, federalism, and
prosecutorial discretion are implicated by this injunction, and
that “judicial intrusion into executive discretion of such high
order should be minimal.” Hartman, 547 U.S. at 263. Indeed,
there is a “presumption of regularity behind the charging
decision,” id. at 265, and “so long as the prosecutor has probable
cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined
by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what
charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests
entirely in his discretion.” Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364. Yet
we “have a limited authority to affect prosecutorial actions when
those actions are taken in violation of the Constitution,” United
States v. Santtini, 963 F.2d 585, 596 (3d Cir. 1992), and there
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are rare instances where a federal court may assess the quantum
of evidence underlying a threatened state prosecution. See
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 n.8 (1970)
(suggesting that a prosecutor’s broad authority may be
questioned where “the prosecutor threatened prosecution on a
charge not justified by the evidence”). This case presents one of
those rare instances.18
*

*

*

*

*

At this preliminary stage we conclude that plaintiffs have
shown a likelihood of success on their claims that any
prosecution would not be based on probable cause that Doe
committed a crime, but instead in retaliation for Doe’s exercise
of her constitutional rights not to attend the education program.
Therefore, we affirm the grant of a preliminary injunction and
remand for further proceedings.

18

This decision does not open the door to federal courts
serving as a screening mechanism for state prosecutions. Before
us is the unique circumstance of a prosecutor revealing
unequivocally that a prosecution would be brought solely in
response to a potential defendant’s exercise of a constitutional
right. As the Supreme Court noted in Hartman, these
“[u]nambiguous admissions” are “likely to be rare.” 547 U.S.
at 264 n.10.
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